Encheiridion 1 focuses on what is up to us and contrasts the tranquil psychological state of those who focus their attention and impulse only on those things and events within their control with the troubled mind of those who attempt to control what is not in their power. The second chapter of Encheiridion further defines the concepts of desire and aversion and adds another important concept: things contrary to Nature. Encheiridion 2 opens with the following advice:
Keep in mind that desire presumes your getting what you want and that aversion presumes your avoiding what you don’t want, and that not getting what we want makes us unfortunate, while encountering what we don’t want makes us miserable.
We have a few things to unpack in this passage. First is that we should “keep in mind” the lesson of Encheiridion 2. This means we should memorize it, remember it, and regularly remind ourselves about it. The phrase “keep in mind” is translated from the Greek word Μέμνησο, which appears sixteen times within fourteen different chapters of the Encheiridion. As I noted in the introduction to this series, Arrian created the Encheiridion to serve as a handbook that can be kept close at hand or carried in the hand. Arrian filled it with reminders that help us “keep in mind” those Stoic doctrines that are essential to our practice. So, what is so important about the lesson of Encheiridion 2 that warrants keeping it in mind? In short, this lesson defines the key distinction between true freedom and slavery in Epictetus’ teaching, which entails wanting only what is up to us, avoiding only what is contrary to nature, and treating everything else as inconsequential to our goal of developing an excellent moral character and experiencing true well-being. To comprehend this lesson’s meaning and its application in our daily lives, we must have a solid grasp of several key concepts, including desire, aversion, things contrary to nature, and reservation.
Desires and Aversions Exist in our Psyche
When we assent to a value judgment attached to an impression of a thing or event—that it is either good or bad—we create a desire or aversion that acts upon us in the form of an impulse to either seek or avoid that thing or event. Therefore, desires and aversions are not external entities that tempt us or frighten us. They do not exist out there in the world; they exist as real mental faculties in our psyche (soul) that we must restrain and ultimately retrain.
The first time I read this new translation of Encheiridion 2 by A. A. Long, his use of the word “presumes” in this passage struck me as odd. I recalled no other translation using that word, so I checked a few others. Pay attention to the language used to describe the activity of desires and aversions in each of these translations:
A. Long:
desire presumes your getting what you want, aversion presumes your avoiding what you don’t want
Robin Hard:
desire promises the attaining of what you desire, and aversion the avoiding of what you want to avoid
Thomas Higginson:
desire demands the attainment of that of which you are desirous; and aversion demands the avoidance of that to which you are averse
W.A. Oldfather:
the promise of desire is the attainment of desire, that of aversion is not to fall into what is avoided
The language being used here is rather curious. It describes desires and aversions as real entities with the ability to make presumptions, promises, and demands. However, according to Stoicism, to act on us in this way, these desires and aversions and the impulses they produce must be real physical faculties in our psyche. In fact, they are. As Marcus Aurelius notes repeatedly in his Meditations, those impulses created by our desires and aversions control us like puppets (2.2; 6.16; 6.28; 7.3; 7.29; 12.19). We must be careful here lest we misinterpret this language to support a form of dualism where a separate mind acts upon our body. That is not the case in Stoic theory. As Christopher Gill, professor of ancient thought at Exeter University, points out:
The normal Stoic standpoint is what we might call psychophysical monism or holism: the psyche is conceived as physical and identified with one of the natural elements, pneuma, a mixture of fire and air.[1]
In Stoic theory, desires, aversions, and impulses are not external to our psyche; they are natural emotional states that get corrupted and become dysfunctional passions. This occurs when natural desires and aversions that can benefit us and promote our survival are transformed into passions that pull us around like puppets and leave us with troubled minds. We simply learned to value and fear the wrong things.[2] Simplicius, the sixth-century Neoplatonist, wrote the following about this chapter and the concepts of desire and aversion in his famous commentary on the Encheiridion:
The promise and goal of desire is the attainment of what is desired, and the ‘fortunate’ are those who attain this. The promise and goal of aversion is that you will not encounter what you flee from, and this (i.e. not encountering it) is being ‘of good fortune’. Similarly, not attaining the object of your desire is ‘unfortunate’ (because you didn’t attain it), while encountering the object of your aversion is ‘ill-fortuned’–the contrary of good fortune–(because you attained something, but what you attained was bad).[3]
The Presumption of Desires and Aversions
Again, when I first read Long’s new translation of Encheiridion 2, I was struck by the word “presumes” in reference to desires and aversions. Therefore, after I read other highly regarded translations, I looked up the definition of presume and here is what I found. The Oxford online dictionary defines presume as a verb that means to “Suppose that something is the case on the basis of probability.”[4] My hardbound version of the Oxford English Dictionary defines presume as a verb that means to “Undertake without adequate authority or permission.”[5] Both of those definitions are quite helpful for the unpacking of this passage from Encheiridion 2, which reads:
desire presumes your getting what you want, aversion presumes your avoiding what you don’t want (Ench 2)
Using the first definition, a desire or aversion must have some reasonable probability of success otherwise it is nothing more than a pipe dream or whimsical fantasy. However, if we combine this with A.A. Long’s definition of desire, we get “a strong acquisitive attitude toward what appears good,” and we have a reasonable chance to obtain, like a better paying job, good health, a good reputation, etc. Likewise, an aversion is “a strongly negative attitude toward what appears bad,” and we have a reasonable chance to avoid, like poverty, sickness, public shame, etc. As we will learn in Exploring Encheiridion 15, it is acceptable to stretch out our hand and take a portion of any preferred indifferent providence has brought into our lives. However, we become enslaved by those externals when we stretch our desire out for them as things that are good in themselves. The opposite is true of those externals we wish to avoid. Why? The answer to that question invokes the second definition from above. Our desires and aversions entail the presumption there is a good probability we can obtain or avoid the externals we consider good or bad. However, as the Stoics make quite clear, Nature does not grant us the authority or permission to presume that we can obtain or avoid those externals—they are not up to us.
Things Contrary to Nature (para phusin)
This brings us to the next passage from Encheiridion 2, which reads:
So if, among the *things contrary to nature you restrict aversion to those that are up to you, you will experience none of the things you don’t want, but if you are averse to sickness or death or poverty, you will be miserable. So move aversion away from everything that is not up to us and transfer it to the things contrary to nature that are up to us.
This passage deals with the intersection of two sets of things and events. The first set includes those things and events that are contrary to nature. This refers to things contrary to our human well-being such as sickness, poverty, social isolation, and emotional disturbances (pathê). The second set includes only what is up to us, which includes our assents, desires and aversion, and impulses toward action. Epictetus is advising us that among those things contrary to nature, we should seek to avoid only that which is up to us—our passions (strong emotions). If we seek to avoid the others—sickness, poverty, a bad reputation, etc.—we will be miserable. As Keith Seddon writes:
And this is what we must train ourselves in: we must let everything happen as it will with an open acceptance (Discourses 1.12.15–17), even those things to which we are usually averse, seeking to avoid only ‘those things contrary to nature amongst the things that are in our power’, and these are the passions (pathê), the ‘disturbing or violent emotions’ that constitute our misery. Passions are excessive impulses, ‘contrary to nature’ because they are ‘contrary to correct and natural reasoning’ (Stob. 2.7.10a), in that any one passion is, or is dependent upon, a false judgement concerning what is good and bad for us (see DL 7.111; LS 65G3); they are ‘excessive’ because they are ‘disobedient to the choosing reason or an irrational motion of the soul’ (Stob. 2.7.10, trans. Pomeroy; see also DL 7.110); and they are ‘in our power’ because it is entirely up to us how we evaluate things, and whether we assent to the judgements that sanction (or comprise) the passions…[6]
Likewise, in Simplicius’ commentary on the Encheiridion we read:
if you avoid disease or poverty, since fleeing from them is not completely up to us (because even if we have a power which some times helps us escape them, still it won’t always hold good, or do so entirely), you will inevitably be ill-fortuned when you encounter those states (which we tend to avoid). But if we are persuaded by him, and transfer our aversion to what is contrary to nature among things that are up to us –for instance, avoiding false beliefs about existent things and obstacles to a way of life in accordance with nature and in line with reason – then we will never encounter what we are avoiding. (After all, escaping from such things is up to us, in as much as the only thing we need for it is aversion, and this is up to us.)[7]
Give Up Desire Completely for the Time Being
This brings us to the most challenging part of Encheiridion 2 where Epictetus offers some sober advice for the new Stoic practitioner.
As for desire, give it up completely for the time being. Otherwise, if you desire any of the things that are not up to us, you are bound to be unfortunate, while none of the things up to us, which it would be fine to desire, will be available to you.
Keith Seddon writes the following about this passage:
When our desires are frustrated, or our aversions incurred, we react with a range of emotions whose occurrence diminishes or entirely undermines any ‘good flow of life’ (euroia biou) we may have been enjoying (however impoverished a ‘flow’ this might be in comparison with the Stoic ideal)–or else makes an already unsatisfactory situation even worse. These emotions (anger, frustration, disappointment, fear, or what have you) are what constitute our misfortune and misery.[8]
Therefore, Epictetus tells the new Stoic practitioner to give up desiring everything “for the time being” because even those things that are up to us and “would be fine to desire”—the good—will not be available to the new practitioner for a while. Why? Because we cannot seek the good until we understand what is truly good. We cannot follow nature until we adequately grasp our nature as a rational human being and our relationship to cosmic Nature. That understanding takes some time. As Brad Inwood writes:
In keeping with his heightened emphasis on the central goal of ethical activity, the pursuit of the good in contrast to merely appropriate actions, Epictetus urged his students to suspend all orexis [desire] so that eventually their orexis might become eulogos (reasonable, i.e. correct). Until the would-be philosopher’s conception of the good was correct, and he saw that its attainment was wholly in his own power, one dared not unleash his vehement but natural urge to attain the good.[9]
Therefore, Epictetus is teaching us that we should put all desires aside until we understand the true nature of the good, which is virtue alone, and can discern which indifferents are appropriate for the pursuit of that end. Again, this does not entail giving up your job, family, house, and possessions to live as a Cynic in the streets. However, it does imply that a new practitioner must restrain their desires for all externals for a while. We see this same message within several passages of the Discourses. Here is one example:
One who is making progress, having learned from the philosophers that desire has good things for its object, and aversion bad things, and having also learned that serenity and freedom from passion can be achieved only by one who is neither frustrated in his desires nor falls into what he wants to avoid—such a person, then, has rid himself of desire altogether and put it aside for the present, and feels aversion only towards those things that lie within the sphere of choice. For if he tries to avoid anything that lies outside the sphere of choice, he knows that he’ll run into some such thing one day, in spite of the aversion that he feels for it, and so be unhappy. (Discourses 1.4.1-2)
In his commentary on this passage, Christopher Gill writes:
this advice reflects the Stoic belief that only virtue (and not the ‘indifferents’ that are the usual objects of desire) is a proper object of desire. Since most people, including Epictetus’ students, do not yet understand fully what virtue is, they should avoid desire for the present—while still aiming at forming a better understanding of what is truly desirable.[10]
Likewise, as independent scholar Robert Dobbin notes in his respected commentary on Discourses Book 1, the Stoics taught that desire can be either good or bad depending on its aim.
If good, or ‘reasonable’, it was equivalent to ‘wishing’ (boulesis) a good emotion. If bad, it was equivalent to ‘appetite’ (epithumia: DL 7. 113, 1 16; Cic. Ac. 2. 135). At 3.13.21 [Epictetus] says to ‘refrain sometimes from desire altogether, that at a later time you may exercise desire reasonably (eulogos)’. This is evidently the ‘reasonable desire’ of which the Stoa approved. But first one has to get rid of ‘appetite’, bad, irrational desire. And so [Epictetus] recommends temporarily suspending desire altogether. The special reason for this is that the consequence of frustrated desire is drastic.[11]
Therefore, Epictetus is not teaching the eradication of desire altogether. Instead, he is teaching us that we must restrain all desires until we retrain ourselves to desire virtue alone and to seek only those externals that are appropriate to that end. Thus, in the Discourses we read:
For who is a man in training? One who practises not exercising his desire, and practises exercising his aversion only in relation to things that lie within the sphere of choice, practising especially hard in matters that are difficult to master. So different people will practise hardest with regard to different things. (Discourses 3.12.8)
Here we see Epictetus’ understanding that “different people” will face and struggle with desires for “different things.” It is up to each of us, as individuals, to discern those desires and aversions that control us like puppets.
Reserve Clause
Nevertheless, we cannot remain entirely inactive even during this time of restraint. Life goes on. We have classes to attend, jobs we must perform adequately, family and social responsibilities we must fulfill. Epictetus recognized that fact, and he offers a plan of action for those in the early stages of their Stoic practice. He says:
Confine yourself to motivation and disinclination, and apply these attitudes lightly, with *reservation and without straining.
According to Epictetus, we can still be motivated to study, go to work, take care of our physical well-being, and attend to our familial and social responsibilities while we are restraining our desires and aversions. How? By attending to them “lightly, with reservation and without straining.” In other words, attend to your necessary affairs by seeking but not “straining” for a particular outcome. Seeking to do well on a test, close a business deal, get a promotion, achieve a social or political goal is fine as long as we do not desire the outcome or fear its opposite. Here we see a distinction between the desires and aversions that lead to disturbing emotions (pathê) and the type of motivation and disinclination that is natural and necessary for daily life. Here is a passage from Seneca’s On Tranquility of Mind that highlights that distinction:
I think Democritus was following this principle when he began, “Whoever wants to live tranquilly should not do much business, public or private.” Surely he was referring to superfluous affairs. For if they are essential, then not just many but countless tasks have to be done both privately and publicly; but when no binding duty summons us, we should check our activities. The man who has a lot of business often gives fortune power over himself. It is safest to test it seldom, and for the rest always to have it in mind and make himself no promises about it: “I shall make a voyage, unless something happens,” “I shall be elected praetor, unless something prevents it,” and “My business deal will work out well unless something forestalls it.” This is why we say that nothing ever befalls the wise man against his expectations; we are exempting him not from the misfortunes of men but from their mistakes. For him, things turn out not as he wanted but as he anticipated; above all he anticipated that something could oppose his plans. Then too the pain of an abandoned desire necessarily falls more lightly on the mind when you have not promised yourself a good outcome. (On Tranquility of Mind 13)
You will notice that Seneca is applying reservation to every example he provides in this passage. This reservation, otherwise known as the reserve clause, recognizes that what we seek in the external world is not up to us. Life requires us to be motivated to achieve particular appropriate ends. When we are hungry, thirsty, or cold, we experience the motivation or impulse to seek food, water, and shelter, or warm clothing, respectively. Those are natural impulses. The same is true of our impulses to acquire a job, life partner, healthy body, good reputation, etc. However, without our recognition that achieving those things is not completely up to us, we will be frustrated if we do not obtain them. Recalling those definitions of the word “presume,” if we desire a particular thing, we are presuming a high probability of attaining it even though we lack the adequate authority or permission to guarantee such an end. Therefore, desires and aversions motivate us to presume authority over the external world. We do not have any such authority over Nature. Therefore, when we are motivated to achieve a particular goal, we must keep in mind that Nature, in the form of a providentially ordered cosmos, may bring about something entirely different. When we seek such ends with reservation and without straining, we are prepared to accept and love whatever actually comes about. Then, we can stand with Marcus and say to the cosmos:
Everything suits me that suits your designs, O my universe. Nothing is too early or too late for me that is in your own good time. All is fruit for me that your seasons bring, O nature. All proceeds from you, all subsists in you, and to you all things return. (Meditations 4.23)
If you are a regular listener to this podcast, you will undoubtedly know that I quote this passage from Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations frequently. I do so because it so beautifully expresses the fundamental Stoic attitude toward external circumstances and highlights the trusting relationship with the cosmos that Stoic practice develops. That attitude and relationship are expressions of true freedom, the type of freedom that was equally accessible to Epictetus—a Roman slave—and Marcus Aurelius—a Roman emperor. That freedom is still available to everyone, regardless of life circumstances. It is available to all of us who will follow the Stoic path of moral excellence toward a state of well-being that does not depend on anything outside of our control.
Glossary
RESERVATION A technical term (Greek hypexairesis) for the way rational agents should qualify or “hold back” their inclinations and disinclinations, in order to adjust them to the future’s uncertainty.
THINGS CONTRARY TO NATURE Technical phrase (Greek ta para physin) for anything in Stoicism that conflicts with optimal human well-being. The expression often refers to such conditions as bodily sickness and poverty, which we are naturally motivated to try to avoid. Because successful avoidance of such things is not simply “up to us,” Epictetus restricts the scope of the term here to aberrant mental states. He takes these states (e.g., pathological emotions and unethical motivations) to be contrary to the rational norms of human nature, entirely “up to us,” and therefore fully avoidable.
ENDNOTES:
[1] Gill, C. (2013). Marcus Aurelius Meditations, Books 1-6. New York: Oxford University Press, p. lix
[2] For those who may be interested in a modern theory that is compatible with the psychological monism of the Stoics and a technical explanation of emotions as physical states that are not necessarily bad, I recommend: Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam. His “somatic marker” theory offers an interesting conception of emotion that is compatible with Stoic psychology in many ways.
[3] Brennan, T., & Brittain, C. (2002). Simplicius: On Epictetus’ Handbook 1-26. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 61
[4] https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/presume
[5] Brown, L. (Ed.). (1993). The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[6] Seddon, K. (2005). Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living. London; New York: Routledge, p. 40
[7] Brennan, T., & Brittain, C. (2002). Simplicius: On Epictetus’ Handbook 1-26. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 62
[8] Seddon, K. (2005). Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes: Guides to Stoic Living. New York: Routledge, p. 39
[9] Inwood, B. (1985). Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 119
[10] Hard, R. (2014). Epictetus: Discourses, Fragments, Handbook. (C. Gill, Ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, p. 307
[11] Dobbin, R. (1998). Epictetus: Discourses, Book 1. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 91-2
